Many families face the dilemma of whether to invite non-observant friends or relatives to a Shabbat or Yom Tov meal. On one hand, the potential for positive spiritual impact is enormous, as outreach (kiruv) professionals agree that seeing a joyous family experience a peak Torah event such as a Yom Tov meal has motivated many to increase their level of commitment to Torah observance. On the other hand, extending an invitation to a non-observant Jew to join a Yom Tov meal may involve the guest driving to the meal by car.
This question is even more critical for one who recently has become religious but had previously hosted family gatherings for Yom Tov meals. If he does not continue inviting his relatives, he risks alienating them further. Similarly, if one does not invite relatives to a Shabbat or Yom Tov Bar Mitzvah, he may cause them great insult. The poskim of the twentieth century grappled with this quandary and have arrived at a variety of conclusions. We shall present three approaches: those of Rav Moshe Feinstein, Rav Moshe Shternbuch, and Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach.
Rav Moshe Feinstein
In 1953, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 1:99) was asked by a Rav in Detroit as to whether it is permissible for him to encourage people to come to shul knowing that those who live far away will drive to shul on Shabbat. Rav Moshe strongly advocates not encouraging attendance. He argues that doing so would constitute a violation of the prohibition of lifnei iveir lo titein michshol (Vayikra 19:14), placing a stumbling block before the blind. Chazal (Avodah Zarah 6b) understand this prohibition to include facilitating others (analogous to the blind, as they are blinded by their passions) to sin (the stumbling block). Extending the invitation to shul facilitates their sinful behavior of driving on Shabbat, a serious violation of Torah law, as each time one presses on the accelerator pedal, he violates the prohibition of hav’ara (kindling a fire) on Shabbat.1For an explanation why it is also forbidden to drive on Yom Tov even though kindling a fire is permitted in many circumstances, see Teshuvot Yechave Da’at 3:36.
Rav Moshe goes even further, asserting that extending such an invitation not only violates Lifnei Iveir, but also constitutes violating a more serious sin, namely, meisit, convincing someone to sin (Devarim 13:7-12), which in certain circumstances constitutes a capital crime. Rav Moshe proves that meisit applies beyond cases of influencing someone to worship avodah zarah (idolatry), the case given in the Torah, from the Gemara (Sanhedrin 29a) that classifies the snake of the Garden of Eden (Breishit 3) as a meisit. The snake never attempted to convince anyone to worship avodah zarah; it “merely” convinced Chavah to violate Hashem’s command not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge. Rav Moshe notes that even though convincing someone to violate a prohibition other than avodah zarah does not constitute a capital crime, it nevertheless is a very severe prohibition, to the extent that the heavenly court will not muster a defense for such action on one’s Day of Judgment, just as Hashem did not suggest a defense for the snake of the Garden of Eden (Sanhedrin 29a).
Some have noted that this ruling of Rav Moshe appears to be inconsistent with his ruling (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 4:79) that observant doctors are permitted to exchange shifts with non-observant Jews even if they will be causing the non-observant Jews to violate Shabbat. Rav Moshe reasons that since the non-observant in any event would violate Shabbat, it is better for them to spend Shabbat in the hospital where they will work for the sake of saving lives rather than violating Shabbat outside the hospital.2For further discussion of this issue, see Gray Matter 2:6-7 and Rabbi Howard D. Apfel’s essay in The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 57:73-95. One could similarly argue that it is better for the the non-observant Jews to spend Shabbat morning in shul, where they will not violate Shabbat, rather than in other venues where they would violate Shabbat the entire morning.
It would seem that Rav Moshe forbade encouraging attendance in shul because it implies endorsement of driving on Shabbat simply for the purpose of a mitzvah. However, switching shifts does not necessarily imply endorsement of violating Shabbat, because it is in fact permitted (and required) to violate Shabbat in order to save lives. Thus, Rav Moshe might forbid inviting non-observant Jews for Yom Tov meals, because doing so implies endorsement of their driving.
Rav Moshe Shternbuch
Rav Moshe Shternbuch was asked by a newly-observant man if he was permitted to invite his parents to Shabbat evening dinner knowing that they would drive home after the meal. Rav Shternbuch permits the invitation, especially given that the child told his parents that he was upset with them driving on Shabbat.
Rav Shternbuch makes a bold assertion regarding the prohibition of lifnei iveir. He argues that this restriction applies only if one seeks to harm the other individual. However, one does not violate lifnei iveir if his intention is to help the other person. Rav Shternbuch argues that lifnei iveir is analogous to the prohibition to wound (chavalah) in this regard; just as it is permitted to “wound” for therapeutic purposes, such as a surgeon performing a needed operation, so too, one is permitted to cause another Jew to sin in order to benefit them.
Since the man intends to help his parents by inviting them to a Shabbat meal and thereby bringing them closer to Torah observance, he does not violate lifnei iveir. Rav Shternbuch notes that in the case in question, the parents were positively disposed towards being drawn closer to Torah life, and the Shabbat meal invitations were indeed part of the process of supporting their return to religious observance.
Although Rav Shternbuch does not cite any precedent for his view, perhaps we can garner support for his approach from a suggestion made by Rav Akiva Eiger (Y.D. 181:6).3A similar suggestion is made the Tiferet Shmuel (Bava Metzia 5:3). Some background information is needed to understand this suggestion. First, we must note that a man is forbidden to shave his face with a razor (makif) and is forbidden to be shaved by a razor (nikaf; see Makkot 20b). A woman is not included in this prohibition (Kiddushin 1:7), but violates lifnei iveir if she shaves a man’s face with a razor (Shulchan Aruch ad. loc.).
Rav Akiva Eiger suggests, though, that if a man is determined to shave with a razor and cannot be persuaded to refrain from such activity, it is better for a woman to shave him than for him to shave himself. He reasons that had the man shaved himself, he would violate two prohibitions, shaving and being shaved. If the woman shaves him, though, he violates only one prohibition, that of being shaved. Even though the woman herself seemingly violates the prohibition of lifnei iveir by shaving the man, Rav Akiva Eiger permits her to shave him. Perhaps this suggestion supports Rav Shternbuch’s approach that one is not in violation of lifnei iveir if in the bigger picture he is helping that person. We should note, though, that some poskim do not accept Rav Akiva Eiger’s approach (see Teshuvot Tzitz Eliezer 15:19), and one can distinguish between Rav Shternbuch’s case and Rav Akiva Eiger’s case.4In the case discussed by Rav Akiva Eiger, the man would have shaved with a razor in any event, and assisting him may constitute only a rabbinic violation of lifnei iveir (see below in the chapter entitled “Serving Food to a Jew who will not Recite a Brachah”), while Rav Shternbuch is discussing a case in which the non-observant Jew would not have driven if not for the invitation, which would constitute lifnei iveir on a Torah-level. Nonetheless, some support to Rav Shternbuch can be marshaled from Rav Akiva Eiger, as the rulings do share a similar attitude and approach.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach
We should note that Chazal already grappled with issues of relationships between fully-observant and less-observant Jews. Although, generally speaking, Jews in the time of Chazal were observant of most Torah laws, there were some Jews who were lax in their observance of some exceedingly challenging laws, such as shmittah (refraining from working the land in the seventh year).
The Mishnah (Shevi’it 5:6) teaches that it is prohibited to sell certain agricultural implements to such semi-observant Jews during shemittah. Plowing implements, for example, are forbidden to be sold to such Jews during the seventh year, as these items will clearly be used for violation of Torah law, as all plowing is forbidden during shmittah. Harvesting equipment, on the other hand, is permitted to be sold, since certain harvesting is permitted during the shmittah year. The principle is that if the item is expected to be used only for forbidden activity, selling it violates lifnei iveir, but if the item is expected to be used for either forbidden or permitted activity, one does not violate lifnei iveir. One is not facilitating the commission of a sin in such a case, since the item will not necessarily be used for a forbidden use.
Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach applies this principle in a letter addressed to Yeshivat Ohr Sameach, a well-known outreach yeshiva, regarding extending Shabbat and Yom Tov invitations to homes and beginner services in shuls. Rav Auerbach rules that one may invite a non-observant Jew on Shabbat or Yom Tov if he offers him a place to sleep over. In such a case, one does not violate lifnei iveir, since the invitation does not necessarily facilitate the violation of Shabbat or Yom Tov. By framing the invitation in this manner, the situation is analogous to the Mishnah’s case of selling harvesting equipment to a semi-observant Jew. As such, even if the non-observant Jews do drive on Shabbat as a result of the invitation, it is not a violation of lifnei iveir.
Rav Yehudah Amital and Rav Hershel Schachter told me that they accept Rav Shlomo Zalman’s approach, and Rav Yosef Adler reports that Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik also espoused this approach.5For further discussion of Rav Shlomo Zalman’s ruling and of our entire issue, see Rav J. David Bleich’s Contemporary Halakhic Problems 4:92-104. Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, as well, stated (in a shiur delivered at the Torah Academy of Bergen County) that he relies on Rav Shlomo Zalman’s view in cases of great need.
Conclusion
Rav Shlomo Zalman’s approach is adopted in practice by many families, outreach organizations, and shuls. However, one must consider the impact of non-observant relatives driving to or from one’s home on Shabbat and Yom Tov on his children. It must be explained that although they love the relative who visits, the parents are deeply saddened by the violation of Shabbat and Yom Tov.
Some families have dealt with this quandary by limiting their invitations to their non-observant relatives to Chanukah, Purim, or Chol Hamoed.6An invitation for Chol Hamo’ed Pesach might be of special importance if thereby the non-observant Jew will avoid eating chameitz that he otherwise would have consumed. Others will extend the invitation only if the driving will occur on Yom Tov but not Shabbat, since violation of Shabbat is a capital sin and violation of Yom Tov is not. Others will extend the invitation if the guest will violate Shabbat or Yom Tov in only one of his trips (i.e. the guest either arrives before Shabbat or Yom Tov or leaves after Shabbat or Yom Tov ends). In any event, one must carefully weigh his options and seek the guidance of his Rav in resolving this difficult challenge. In our next chapter we address the issue of cooking for non-observant Jews on Yom Tov.